

an answer to the challenges of our time and that instead of „intelligent“ weapons intelligent politics and politicians are in desperate need.

References

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Science and Secrecy In Germany

My statement is concerned primarily with the effects of science policy devoted to military purposes on the German science system especially with regard to the problems of secrecy in science.

Military R&D in Germany

The German circumstances are often said to be similar to the Japanese situation, where only a very small share of scientific resources is committed to military efforts. In the most important and official presentations of our government and in the self-perception of the scientific community in the FRG, the military R&D also plays an astonishingly insignificant role. The portray of military research given in the federal state's central documents of research and military policies in the FRG – that means the nine Federal Research Reports ("Bundesforschungsberichte") of the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) and Defense White Books („Verteidigungsweißbücher“) of the German Defense Ministry (BMVg) published between 1965 and 1990 – in no way corresponds to the actual importance of that field of funding. All together these documents devote not half as many lines as pages to the most important sector of the German science system – the military sector. This seems to be the result of a mode of portrayal which is based upon what one might call a „Technique of Marginalization“. The use of this technique is obviously selective. In no other field of research funding it is to be found in an approximately similar order of magnitude. If we look at the latest government documents, there is absolutely no change in this practice of playing down the importance of military research within the entire science potential. I think, there are historic and contemporary reasons as well for this situation.

After the end of the Second World War, the conduct of military research was prohibited for a number of years in the Federal Republic of Germany. Likewise, the remilitarization, effected nearly four decades ago, could only be enforced by the renouncing of research, development and production of weapons of mass destruction and by the renouncing of the production of a series of important conventional weapons. These restrictions had the effect that up until recently, armaments research in the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance compared to the research in France and England (and, particularly so with the research in the United States and the Soviet Union) was and still is of minor significance. Meanwhile though, those restrictions or bans were either lifted or they were circum-

